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SETH BARRETT TILLMAN* 
I. A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The Founders, the authors of the Constitution of 1787, much 
like you and me, were flesh-and-blood human beings. As a re-
sult, we expect to find errors and exaggeration in their written 
works.1 There is nothing new about that insight. But one al-
leged error has always struck me as somewhat different from 
the others. I am speaking of Hamilton’s 1788 publication, Feder-
alist No. 77. There he wrote: 
It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be ex-
pected from the co-operation of the senate, in the business of 
appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the 
administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to 
displace as well as to appoint. A change of the chief magistrate 
therefore would not occasion so violent or so general a revo-
lution in the officers of the government, as might be ex-
pected if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man 
in any station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness 
for it, a new president would be restrained from attempting 
a change, in favour of a person more agreeable to him, by 
the apprehension that the discountenance of the senate 
might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of dis-
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1. See, e.g., Seth Barrett Tillman, The Federalist Papers as Reliable Historical Source 
Material for Constitutional Interpretation, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 601 (2003) (collecting 
errors and oddities in The Federalist); see also MICHAEL I. MEYERSON, LIBERTY’S 
BLUEPRINT: HOW MADISON AND HAMILTON WROTE THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, DE-
FINED THE CONSTITUTION, AND MADE DEMOCRACY SAFE FOR THE WORLD 158 
(2008); Richard Albert, The Constitutional Imbalance, 37 N.M. L. REV. 1, 6 n.34 
(2007); Dan T. Coenen, A Rhetoric for Ratification: The Argument of The Federalist 
and Its Impact on Constitutional Interpretation, 56 DUKE L.J. 469, 507 n.218, 541–42 
(2006); Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the 
Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 831 (2007).  
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credit upon himself. Those who can best estimate the value 
of a steady administration will be most disposed to prize a 
provision, which connects the official existence of public 
men with the approbation or disapprobation of that body, 
which from the greater permanency of its own composition, 
will in all probability be less subject to inconstancy, than any 
other member of the government.2  
This is the enigmatic great white whale among Founding-era 
documents. Apart from investigating Hamilton’s meaning as an 
intrinsically interesting historical matter, or as an avenue to glean 
more of the worldview of the Framers (or, at least, of Hamilton), 
Federalist No. 77 is also key to understanding our contemporary 
legal debates on separation of powers, executive branch removals, 
and the so-called unitary executive theory.3 Generally speaking, 
the latter provides that the President has a freestanding, constitu-
tionally granted unilateral power to remove executive branch of-
ficers, or, at least, those high-level executive officers he appointed. 
Traditionally, Federalist No. 77 is the rallying cry of those who op-
pose the unitary executive position.4 
To put it another way, partisans of Senate (or congressional) 
power agree with Hamilton (or, at least, they think that they 
                                                                                                                 
2. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 407 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) 
(emphasis added). Federalist No. 77 has an interesting publication history. The 
essay first appeared in The Independent Journal on April 2, 1788, and then in The 
New-York Packet on April 4, 1788. What is now Federalist No. 77 appeared origi-
nally as number 76 in the series, and it did not take its present place as number 77 
until the first collected edition (the M’Lean edition) in 1788. See 4 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 638 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962) (editor’s note). 
3. To be clear, in this Article, I take no position on the validity of the unitary ex-
ecutive theory (in any of its several modern forms) as a matter of the original pub-
lic meaning of the Constitution of 1787. My goal in this Article is to explain Ham-
ilton’s meaning, not the Constitution’s. Of course, the former is some evidence, 
albeit not conclusive evidence, of the latter. My own views on the unitary execu-
tive debates are not the topic of this Article. 
4. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 102 (2009) (rejecting the unitary executive theory and noting 
that “Hamilton assumed that the President would lack the power to unilaterally 
remove an executive officer; rather he could only do so with the Senate’s assent.” 
(citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton))); Heidi Kitrosser, Account-
ability and Administrative Structure, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 607, 621 (2009) 
(explaining that “the most prominent and detailed founding refutation of the 
unitary executive was made by Alexander Hamilton, writing as Publius in the 
New York ratification debates” and concluding that there was no consensus 
during ratification on the “[i]mplications of the [s]ingle, [c]ouncil-[l]ess President” 
(citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton))). 
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agree with Hamilton). These commentators look back to the 
Tenure of Office Act5 and to statements made on the floor of 
the House circa 1789 when the executive branch departments 
were organized and when statutory removal was first de-
bated—all of which, purportedly, are consistent with Hamil-
ton’s statement in Federalist No. 77.6 Partisans of presidential 
power disagree with Hamilton (or, at least, they think they do). 
They argue that Hamilton erred.7 These commentators look to 
Myers v. United States8 and to statements made by Madison on 
the floor of the House during the statutory removal debates. 
Partisans of presidential power and partisans of congressional 
power, despite disputing the underlying constitutional issue of 
the necessity of Senate consent to presidential removal of ex-
ecutive branch officers, both agree with each other on one 
thing: They both believe that Hamilton was speaking to the is-
sue of the removal of federal officers when he stated that “[t]he 
consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as 
to appoint.” This standard or consensus view, the view that 
Hamilton was speaking to removal, has been adopted by Su-
preme Court majorities and dissents, lower federal courts, and 
by academics in law and in other fields.9 
                                                                                                                 
5. An Act regulating the Tenure of certain Civil Offices, ch. 154, § 2, 14 Stat. 430 
(1867) (repealed 1887) (providing that executive branch officers appointed with 
Senate consent may not be removed from their offices by the President absent 
Senate consent); id. at 432 (noting final passage of the bill by congressional over-
ride after veto by President Andrew Johnson).  
6. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administra-
tion, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (1994) (“Whatever dispute there may be about the 
removal power of the President over the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and similar 
officers, there is no ambiguity about a central point: the first Congress conceived 
of the proper organizational structure for different executive departments differ-
ently. This conception, we believe, argues against the belief in a strongly unitary 
executive.” (footnotes omitted) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamil-
ton))); see also Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1021, 1036 (2006) (“A half dozen or so Representatives spoke in favor of the 
theory that the Senate’s concurrence was necessary to remove.”).  
7. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not 
To), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2046 n.15 (2006) (“Even The Federalist gets some things 
wrong. Hamilton wrote that the President could not remove subordinates without 
Senate confirmation of the firing . . . .” (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander 
Hamilton))).  
8. 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (stating, in dicta, that the Tenure of Office Act, ch. 154, 
§ 2, was unconstitutional).  
9. See, e.g., id. at 136–37 (Taft, C.J.) (pointing to discussion of Hamilton’s Federal-
ist No. 77 on the House floor in 1789 as supporting the view that the Senate’s con-
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However, this understanding of Federalist No. 77, the view 
that Hamilton was speaking to removal, creates as many prob-
lems as it might resolve. And this is true without regard to 
whether or not you think Hamilton correct or in error. First, the 
standard view is puzzlingly inconsistent with everything we 
know (or, at least, everything that is commonly taught) about 
Hamilton, the premier Founding-era spokesman for energy 
and unity in the executive.10 How is it that he would concede a 
role for the Senate in the removal of federal officers if a con-
trary view were even remotely tenable? Second, Hamilton’s 
opining on the scope of the removal power is inconsistent with 
                                                                                                                 
sent is necessary to effectuate removals, but arguing that Hamilton purportedly 
changed his mind during his service in Washington’s cabinet); id. at 293 & n.86 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Hamilton, in Federalist No. 77, took the 
position that the Senate played a symmetrical role in appointments and remov-
als); United States ex rel. Bigler v. Avery, 24 F. Cas. 902, 904–05 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 
1867) (No. 14,481) (Deady, J.); The Claim of Surgeon Du Barry for Back Pay, 4 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 603, 609 (1847) (Clifford, Att’y Gen.) (“It is conceded that [civil officers] 
are removable at pleasure [of the President] in all cases under the constitution 
where the term of office is not specially declared. It seems, however, that one of 
the authors of the ‘Federalist,’ before the adoption of the constitution, and while it 
was pending before the people for ratification, had intimated a different opinion, 
insisting that ‘the consent of the Senate would be necessary to displace as well as 
to appoint.’”); JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO THE CONSTI-
TUTION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS RULED ON ISSUES FROM ABORTION TO 
ZONING 51–52 (1999) (quoting Federalist No. 77 and noting that “the constitutional 
policy has not worked out as Hamilton argued”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Governmental 
Practice and Presidential Direction: Lessons from the Antebellum Republic?, 45 WIL-
LAMETTE L. REV. 659, 671 n.49 (2009); Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Ad-
ministrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1273 n.39 
(2006); infra note 12 (quoting Professor Akhil Amar). Academics in fields other 
than law have embraced this view. See infra note 10 (quoting, among others, histo-
rians and political scientists). 
10. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 4, at 622 (describing Hamilton as “a staunch 
defender of a strong President”). The standard view of Federalist No. 77 has puz-
zled more than legal academics and jurists; it has puzzled historians and political 
scientists as well. See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS & SUSAN DUNN, GEORGE WASH-
INGTON 68 (2004) (denominating Hamilton’s position as “odd[]”); STANLEY ELKINS 
& ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 
1788–1800, at 106 (1993) (denominating Hamilton’s position in Federalist No. 77 as 
“careless[]”); Jeremy D. Bailey, The New Unitary Executive and Democratic Theory: 
The Problem of Alexander Hamilton, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 453, 458 (2008) (“[A] 
question remains. If Hamilton is the father of the unitary executive, why did he 
write in The Federalist that the president would share the removal power with the 
Senate?”). See generally FORREST MCDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A BIOGRA-
PHY 130–31 (1979); Jeremy D. Bailey, The Traditional View of Hamilton’s Federalist 
No. 77 and an Unexpected Challenge: A Response to Seth Barrett Tillman, 33 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 169 (2010) [hereinafter Bailey, The Traditional View]. 
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his plan for and the purpose of The Federalist. At the outset, his 
plan for The Federalist was to discuss the utility of union; the 
defects of the then-current regime (the government under the 
Articles of Confederation); the need for a more energetic gov-
ernment; and, finally, to respond to objections by providing an 
article-by-article, clause-by-clause defense of the newly pro-
posed Constitution of 1787 as consistent with the principles of 
republican government, liberty, and property.11 The problem is 
that removal, as in pure removal unconnected to any other politi-
cal or legal act, is simply not expressly addressed in the Consti-
tution. To bring up removal is just bad tactics. Why open up that 
can of worms, particularly where one’s conclusion lacks direct 
textual support and any closely reasoned argument?12 Was Ham-
ilton really such a poorly skilled tactician and propagandist? 
There is a third problem with the standard view. This prob-
lem is not historical, but textual. If you read Hamilton’s state-
ment, you will notice that he does not actually use the word 
removal, or any variant on the word removal. Rather, he uses the 
word displace. And that is the key to this ancient intellectual 
puzzle. Hamilton was not speaking to the power of removing 
                                                                                                                 
11. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 4. 
12. During the congressional removal debates of 1789, some members expressed 
the opinion that the power to appoint (a joint presidential-senate power, as a prac-
tical matter, under Article II) is coextensive with the power to remove. See 11 DO-
CUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA: 4 MARCH 1789–3 MARCH 1791, at 860 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. 
eds., 1992) (reproducing a June 16, 1789 extract from THE CONGRESSIONAL REGIS-
TER reporting Representative White as stating in House floor debate: “[i]f then the 
senate is associated with the president in the appointment, they ought also to be 
associated in the dismission from office”); infra note 27 (citing Congressman Smith’s 
1789 personal correspondence, which expresses the view that removals can only be 
effectuated by impeachment or by subsequent appointments). See generally R. B. 
BERNSTEIN, THE FOUNDING FATHERS RECONSIDERED 109–10, 208 n.90 (2009) (col-
lecting secondary sources). Federalist No. 77 is usually understood as akin to this 
view. See, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 131 (describing Hamilton’s position in 
Federalist No. 77 as a “short cut to a ministerial system” with officers “responsible 
to the legislative as well as the executive”); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 565 n.40 (2005) (“[I]t should be noted that in Federal-
ist No. 77, Hamilton/Publius had suggested in passing that the Senate would play 
a symmetric advice-and-consent role in both appointments and removals.” (em-
phasis added)); STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EX-
ECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 440 n.21 (2008) (de-
nominating Hamilton’s position in Federalist No. 77 as a “passing comment” 
(emphasis added)). Professors Amar, Calabresi, and Yoo’s use of “in passing” and 
“passing comment” is as sphinx-like as Hamilton’s original statement. Cf. Kitross-
er, supra note 4, at 621 (denominating Federalist No. 77 as “detailed”). 
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federal officers; rather, he was speaking to who had authority 
to displace federal officers. The two words are akin, but they are 
not, at all times and for all purposes, the same. 
II. A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Not only are the two words akin, they frequently have iden-
tical meaning. For example, on the heels of Henry VIII, one 
might say, The King’s wife was removed from her perch, or equally, 
The King’s wife was displaced from her perch. Here displace means 
“to remove from a position, dignity, or office.”13 But there is 
another way to use displace. One might say The King’s wife was 
displaced by the courtesan. In this instance displace does not mean 
removed; here displace means “to take the place of, supplant, [or] 
‘replace.’”14 One can find examples of using displace for replace 
in any number of documents, both literary15 and legal,16 rough-
                                                                                                                 
13. 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 814 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “displace” as “2. 
[t]o remove from a position, dignity, or office”). 
14. Id. (defining “displace” as “[3]b. to take the place of, supplant, [or] ‘replace’”). 
15. See, e.g., 1 OLIVER GOLDSMITH, AN HISTORY OF THE EARTH, AND ANIMATED 
NATURE 188 (Dublin, James Williams ed., 1777) (“A cork, a ship, a buoy, each 
buries itself a bed on the surface of the water; this bed may be considered as so 
much water displaced . . . .”), quoted in 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 
13, at 814 (third definition of “displace”); cf., e.g., JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, 
bk. I, 14 (London, Peter Parker et al. 1667) (“Gods [sic] Altar to disparage and 
displace For one of Syrian mode . . . .”), quoted in 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
supra note 13, at 814 (third definition of “displace”). I readily admit that evidence 
of usage appearing in Anglo-English publications and dictionaries is only some 
evidence, not conclusive evidence of contemporaneous American usage. 
Not surprisingly, contemporaneous dictionaries (from England) define displace 
both in terms of remove and replace. See, e.g., FRANCIS ALLEN, A COMPLETE ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (London, J. Wilson & J. Fell 1765) (defining “to displace” as “to put 
out of a place; to remove from one place to another; to supersede”); 1 JOHN ASH, 
THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, Ed-
ward Dilly et al. 1775) (defining “displace” as “[to] put out of place, to put in an-
other place, to disturb, to disorder”). Compare 1 FREDERICK BARLOW, THE COM-
PLETE ENGLISH DICTIONARY (London, T. Evans et al. 1772) (defining “to displace” 
as “[2] to put out of a place. To remove from one place to another. To supersede, 
remove, or abolish in order to introduce some other person or thing in the room. To 
put an end to disorder” (emphasis added)), with 1 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 157 (Washing-
ton, Duff Green 1828) (reproducing a May 27, 1794 letter from George Washing-
ton to the Senate “nominat[ing] William Short . . . to be Minister resident for the 
United States to his Catholic Majesty, in the room of William Carmichael, who is 
recalled” (emphasis added)). 
American dictionaries, albeit post-1789, are also murky, and lean slightly 
against the “displace means replace” view. Compare NOAH WEBSTER, A COMPENDI-
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OUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 90 (Philip B. Gove ed., Bounty Books 
1970) (1806) (defining “displace” as “to put out of place; remove, disorder”), and 
id. at 253 (defining “removal” as “the act of moving, a dismission”), with id. at 254 
(defining “replace” as “to put again in due place, to supply”); compare NOAH 
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 261 (New York, 
S. Converse 3d ed. 1830) (defining “displace” as “1. To put out of the usual or 
proper place; to remove from its place. 2. To remove from any state, condition, 
office or dignity. 3. To disorder”), and id. at 689 (defining “remove” as “2. [t]o dis-
place from an office”), with id. at 692 (defining “replace” as “4. [t]o put a compe-
tent substitute in the place of another displaced or of something lost”), and id. at 
810 (defining “supersede” as “2. [t]o come or be placed in the room of; hence, to 
displace or render unnecessary”); compare WILLIAM G. WEBSTER & WILLIAM A. 
WHEELER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 125 (New York, Ivison, 
Blakeman, Taylor & Co. 1878) (defining “displace” as “1. To change the place of; 
to remove 2. To discharge; to depose”), with id. at 422 (defining “supersede” as “1. 
[t]o displace: to replace”). Modern authorities recognize the ambiguity. See KEN-
NETH G. WILSON, THE COLUMBIA GUIDE TO STANDARD AMERICAN ENGLISH 146 
(1993) (“[D]isplace, replace (vv.) To displace something is ‘to move it, to put some-
thing in its place, to remove from office or to fire’: The new robot displaces nearly 
twenty workers. The hulls of a catamaran displace surprisingly little water. To replace 
something is either ‘to put it back where it was’ or ‘to supplant it with something 
new’: I replaced the broken window pane. The new robot replaces nearly twenty work-
ers.”). 
16. See, e.g., Del. Const. of 1776, art. IV, reprinted in 1 The Federal and State Con-
stitutions Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, 
and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America 562–63 
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., Gov’t Printing Office 1909) [hereinafter Federal and 
State Constitutions] (“The other branch shall be called ‘The council,’ and consist of 
nine members; three to be chosen for each county at the time of the first election of 
the assembly, who shall be freeholders of the county for which they are chosen, 
and be upwards of twenty-five years of age. At the end of one year after the gen-
eral election, the councillor who had the smallest number of votes in each county 
shall be displaced, and the vacancies thereby occasioned supplied by the freemen of 
each county choosing the same or another person at a new election in manner 
aforesaid. . . . And this rotation of a councillor being displaced at the end of three 
years in each county, and his office supplied by a new choice shall be continued 
afterwards in due order annually forever, whereby, after the first general election, 
a councillor will remain in trust for three years from the time of his being elected, 
and a councillor will be displaced, and the same or another chosen in each county 
at every election.” (emphasis added)). 
Compare 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 4 MARCH 1789–3 MARCH 1791, supra note 12, at 867 
(reproducing a June 16, 1789 extract from THE CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER report-
ing House floor speech of James Madison in which he arguably uses displace in the 
sense of replace: “[The President] is impeachable for any crime or misdemeanor, 
before the senate, at all times; and that at all events he is impeachable before the 
community at large every four years, and liable to be displaced if his conduct shall 
have given umbrage during the time he has been in office.” (emphasis added)), 
with id. at 868 (reproducing a June 16, 1789 extract from THE CONGRESSIONAL REG-
ISTER reporting James Madison's House floor speech: “The question now resolves 
itself into this, Is the power of displacing an executive power?” (emphasis added)), 
id. at 878 (reproducing a June 20, 1789 extract from the GAZETTE OF THE U.S. re-
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ly contemporaneous with the Constitution’s drafting and ratifi-
cation. Indeed, one finds displaced used by Madison (as Pub-
lius) in Federalist No. 47, but whether he meant it as removed or 
replaced is unclear.17 
Using displace to mean replace seems to have occurred with 
some frequency in colonial charters and grants, albeit such in-
struments were from an earlier time.18 In some instances, hold-
                                                                                                                 
porting Madison’s speech as follows: “The question resolves itself into this: Is the 
power of displacing officers an executive, or legislative power?” (emphasis add-
ed)), and 25 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 569, 573 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 
1977) (writing in The Examination No. XVII under the name Lucius Crassus, on 
March 20, 1802, Hamilton arguably used displace in the sense of remove: “[T]he 
Executive has such an agency in the enacting of laws, that as a general rule, the 
displacement of the officer [by legislation] cannot happen against his pleasure.” 
(emphasis added)). 
17. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 266 
(“[T]he chief magistrate with his executive council are appointable by the legisla-
ture [in Virginia]; that two members of the latter [council] are triennially displaced 
at the pleasure of the legislature . . . .” (emphasis added)), with VA. CONST. of 1776, 
reprinted in 7 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 16, at 3817 (“Two 
members [of the council] shall be removed, by joint ballot of both Houses of As-
sembly, at the end of every three years . . . . These vacancies . . . shall be supplied 
by new elections, in the same manner.”). My own view is that Madison’s use of 
displaced here comes closer to the replace meaning than the remove meaning. But see 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 384 (arguably using 
displacing in the sense of removing: “It may perhaps be asked how the shortness of 
the duration in office can affect the independence of the executive on the legisla-
ture, unless the one were possessed of the power of appointing or displacing the 
other?” (emphasis added)). 
18. See, e.g., CHARTER OF GEORGIA of 1732, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 16, at 772 (“And our further will and pleasure is, that 
the said common council for the time being, or the major part of such common 
council, which shall be present and assembled for that purpose, from time to time, 
and at all times hereafter, shall and may nominate, constitute and appoint a treas-
urer or treasurers, secretary or secretaries, and such other officers, ministers and 
servants of the said corporation as to them or the major part of them as shall be 
present, shall seem proper or requisite for the good management of their affairs; 
and at their will and pleasure to displace, remove and put out such treasurer or trea-
surers, secretary or secretaries, and all such other officers, ministers and servants, 
as often as they shall think fit so to do; and others in the room, office, place or station of 
him or them so displaced, remove[d] or put out, to nominate, constitute and appoint; 
and shall and may determine and appoint, such reasonable salaries, perquisites 
and other rewards, for their labor, or service of such officers, servants and persons 
as to the said common council shall seem meet . . . .” (emphasis added)); GRANT 
OF THE PROVINCE OF MAINE of 1639, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS, supra note 16, at 1629 (“And the said Judges Justices Magistrates and Offi-
cers and every or any of them from time to time to displace and remove when the 
said Sir Fardinando Gorges his heires or assignes shall thinke fitt and to place oth-
ers in theire roomes and steed[.]” (emphasis added)). 
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ers of charter-granted powers were given both a removal power 
and a displacement power, which might indicate that they were 
understood to embody distinct, albeit related, powers. For ex-
ample, The Charter of Massachusetts Bay of 1691 provides: “[T]he 
said Councillors or Assistants or any of them shall or may at 
any time hereafter be removed or displaced from their respective 
Places or Trust of Councillors or Assistants by any Great or 
Generall [sic] Court or Assembly[.]”19 To be sure, it is possible 
that the Charter’s use of removed is coextensive with displaced. 
Florid and repetitious usage was widespread in contempora-
neous documents, particularly documents involving the grant 
of royal powers. But it is also possible that the two terms were 
meant to be distinguishable. Removed may indicate a pure re-
moval, that is, the removal of an official for policy or ideologi-
cal reasons, or to save funds. Displaced may indicate that the 
empowered body or official had the power to replace a public 
official, not just to remove the current occupant. In other words, 
when an officer is displaced, he is removed by and in conjunction 
with the act of replacing him. 
III. A HISTORICAL CONJECTURE 
Why might Hamilton have used displace in this manner? Mod-
ern commentators tend to forget how small the appointed-
officer civil list was in the early republic. For example, when a 
new state came into the Union during the antebellum period, it 
received few salaried officers. Initially, a new state may have 
received little more than provision for an Article III district court 
judge (with salary provided for a clerk of the court), a tax offi-
cial, a United States Marshal, and a United States Attorney.20 
Moreover, such officers did not always have salary provided for 
a deputy, a second, an alternate, or an assistant. A President, even 
                                                                                                                 
19. THE CHARTER OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY of 1691, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 16, at 1879 (emphasis added). 
20. See, e.g., An Act giving effect to the laws of the United States within the state 
of Vermont, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 197, 197 (1791) (providing for a single district court 
judge in the state of Vermont); id. § 7, 1 Stat. at 198 (presuming the existence of a 
federal marshal); id. § 8 (providing for a collector of duties); An Act for the admis-
sion of the State of Vermont into this Union, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 191 (1791); see also 1 
JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA, supra note 15, at 80 (reproducing a March 4, 1791 letter from George 
Washington to the Senate nominating a district court judge, a United States At-
torney, a United States Marshal, and a collector of duties). 
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if he had a strong ideological disagreement with an officer within his 
removal power, may have been quite reluctant to remove a distant fed-
eral officer21 absent an on-hand Senate-approved replacement. Why? 
Who would serve process and subpoenas, who would execute 
warrants, and who would seize alleged contraband, evidence of 
crime, and criminals if the only United States Marshal in the ju-
risdiction were removed absent a deputy who could function as 
an acting United States Marshal?22 Who would represent the 
United States in ongoing civil litigation and who would prose-
cute alleged criminals if the only United States Attorney in a ju-
risdiction were removed absent an assistant who could function 
as an acting United States Attorney?23 And who would assess 
and collect federal duties during the interregnum between a 
pure removal and a subsequent appointment?24 Hamilton’s Fed-
                                                                                                                 
21. Cf. Bowerbank v. Morris, 3 F. Cas. 1062, 1064 (C.C.D. Pa. 1801) (No. 1726) 
(Tilghman, C.J.) (“The marshals in many districts of the United States, live so re-
mote from the seat of government, that a considerable time must elapse before notice 
can be received: and it cannot be supposed that it was intended to injure bona fide 
purchasers, who may have paid their money at marshal’s sales before it was pos-
sible to know the [outgoing] marshal was removed.” (emphasis added)). 
22. But see An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 
§§ 27–28, 1 Stat. 73, 87–88 (1789) (permitting deputies to United States Marshals). 
Of course, this Act was enacted after The Federalist was published and after the 
Constitution went into force. 
23. Possibly, in such a situation, federal powers could have been dumped on 
available state officers. See infra note 24 (describing Hamilton’s views in regard to 
the collection of federal taxes by state officers). But even if it is constitutional to 
grant such powers to state officers, even if they could constitutionally act in such 
circumstances, and even if they were duty bound to carry out such duties, there is 
no reason to believe that a President, in such circumstances, would have had con-
fidence in state officers—officers not under his appointment power and not subject 
to his removal power. Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (Scalia, J.) 
(discussing the absence of “meaningful Presidential control” over state officers). 
It is also interesting to speculate about why the First Congress provided that 
federal tax collectors and United States Marshals could make use of deputies, but 
that no similar provision permitted a United States Attorney to appoint an assis-
tant. Compare An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 
§ 35 (providing for the appointment of United States Attorneys in each district but 
not providing for assistants), with id. §§ 27–28 (permitting deputies to United 
States Marshals), and An Act to regulate the Collection of the Duties imposed by 
law on the tonnage of ships or vessels, and on goods, wares and merchandises 
imported into the United States, ch. 5, §§ 6–7, 1 Stat. 29, 37 (1789) (permitting dep-
uties to federal tax collectors). 
24. Compare supra note 23 (discussing potential difficulties in regard to relying 
on state officers), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, 
at 189 (“In other cases [involving the potential for both federal and state taxation], 
the probability is, that the United States will either wholly abstain from the objects 
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eralist No. 77 may not have been a statement about the constitu-
tional or legal limit of the President or the Senate’s removal 
powers, but rather an empirical or practical claim25 or prediction 
to the effect that in most cases removal would be effectuated by 
a subsequent appointment,26 which, not surprisingly, would in-
volve both the President and the Senate, just as any initial ap-
pointment to a vacant office would.27 To put it another way, 
Hamilton, writing in 1788, had no way to know whether a future 
                                                                                                                 
pre-occupied for local purposes, or will make use of the state officers and state 
regulations, for collecting the additional [federal] imposition. This will best an-
swer the views of revenue, because it will save expense in the collection [by the 
federal government], and will best avoid any occasion of disgust to the state gov-
ernments and to the people.”). 
Even if Hamilton’s suggestion here would work in the taxation context, it might 
fail in the civil or criminal litigation context. Reliance on state attorneys and state 
marshals may prove ineffective when the federal government is in litigation against 
a state or its officers, or when the object of the suit is related to property also claimed 
by a state. Likewise, when both a state and the federal government have claims or 
pending charges against a third party, reliance on state officers to give priority to 
federal claims and charges may prove unjustified as a practical matter. The bot-
tom line is that early presidents may have had solid prudential reasons to avoid 
pure removals (which would leave federal functions at the mercy of state and 
municipal officers) in favor of subsequent appointments effectuating removal. 
25. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 407 
(“The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint.” 
(emphasis added)), with McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413–14 
(1819) (Marshall, C.J.) (defining “necessary” in the Sweeping Clause, not in terms 
of absolute physical or legal necessity, but rather, in terms of “any means calcu-
lated to produce the end, and not as being confined to those single means, with-
out which the end would be entirely unattainable”). 
26. Obviously, I am leaving aside special circumstances and complexities in-
volving either recess appointments or appointments to inferior offices—
appointments not requiring Senate consent. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Infe-
rior Office Appointments Clause); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (Recess Appoint-
ments Clause). 
27. Cf. Letter from William Loughton Smith to Edward Rutledge (Aug. 9, 1789), 
in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA: 4 MARCH 1789–3 MARCH 1791, at 1264, 1269 (Charlene Bangs 
Bickford et al. eds., 2004) (“In one or two states, the Governor & Council appoint 
another officer, which operates as a supersedure (if I may so call it) of the person 
in office . . . .”); id. at 1270 (“Again, as the Presidt. & Senate jointly appoint, it ap-
pears that if there be any other mode of removal than by impeachmt., the proper 
mode shod. be to remove the officer by the appointmt. of another, which must be 
by the concurrence of the Senate.”); id. at 1271 (“I have indeed heard it said that it 
was there [at the Philadelphia Convention] understood that the Presidt. & Senate 
would appoint a new officer & thus supersede the old one . . . .”). Smith’s use of 
supersedure in this manner is very similar to how one contemporaneous dictionary 
defined displace. See ALLEN, supra note 15 (defining “to displace” as “to super-
sede”). 
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Congress would provide key executive branch officers stationed 
in the states and in the federal territories with assistants or 
staff.28 And absent such staff, a pure removal would put federal 
functions, supremacy, and perhaps the entire constitutional pro-
ject of “a more perfect Union” at risk. 
From this standpoint, one can see the key function played by 
the Commissions Clause29 under the original Constitution and 
in the early republic. When one officer displaced another, he 
tendered his commission to the outgoing officer as evidence of 
the subsequent appointment. Tender or notice effectuated the 
removal,30 and if any third party were in doubt about who was 
                                                                                                                 
28. But cf. An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 
§§ 27–28 (authorizing United States Marshals to make use of deputies); An Act to 
regulate the Collection of the Duties imposed by law on the tonnage of ships or 
vessels, and on goods, wares and merchandises imported into the United States, 
ch. 5, §§ 6–7 (permitting federal collector of tax duties to be assisted or succeeded 
by a deputy, or, in lieu thereof, a naval officer of the same federal district). Again, 
these statutes were enacted after The Federalist was published and after the Consti-
tution went into force. 
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall Commission all the Officers of 
the United States.”). The point is that the holder of an appointment needed to 
possess his commission in order to displace an outgoing officer. See Letter from 
William Loughton Smith to Edward Rutledge, supra note 27 (noting Congressman 
Smith’s views). But cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Marbury’s Wrongness, 20 CONST. 
COMMENT. 343, 345 (2003) (“If an appointment is complete upon signing by the 
President . . . then delivery is utterly immaterial. If that is the case, then Marbury had 
no real beef with Madison in the first place. He was legally appointed the nanosec-
ond that President Adams signed the commission. He did not need to sue for deliv-
ery of the commission. All he needed to do was ride to the tailor, order a nice robe 
made, and walk into the courthouse and start deciding cases.” (emphasis added)). 
30. See Bowerbank v. Morris, 3 F. Cas. 1062, 1064 (C.C.D. Pa. 1801) (No. 1726) 
(Tilghman, C.J.) (“A removal from office may be either express, that is, by a notifi-
cation by order of the president of the United States that an officer is removed; or 
implied, by the appointment of another person to the same office. But in either 
case, the removal is not completely effected till notice actually [is] received by the 
person removed.”); id. at 1065–66 (Griffith, J.) (“The new commission must be 
accepted and shown to the old marshal, or other notice of it given to him, before 
he can be said to be removed from his office by the will or pleasure of the presi-
dent. There is then a new patentee, and a proper discharge of the old marshal. I do 
not go the length of saying the new marshal must be sworn in . . . but he must 
accept and give notice by showing his commission or otherwise, to his predeces-
sor; and from that time he must be considered as the officer, though before he 
‘enters on the duties of his office,’ he must be sworn in.”); 1 THE PUBLIC STATUTES 
AT LARGE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 87 n.b (Richard Peters ed., Boston, 
Charles C. Little & James Brown 1850) (commenting in an editorial footnote to a 
1789 statute that: “A marshal is not removed by the appointment of a new one, 
until he receives notice of such appointment. All acts done by the marshal after 
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the proper officer, he need only look to the date on the two 
competing commissions. As the commissions emanated from 
equal authorities, the last-in-time controlled.  
IV. CONTRARY EVIDENCE 
There are three pieces of contemporaneous historical evidence 
that contradict the “displace means replace” theory. First, there is 
the simple fact that no one appears to have voiced it before.31 This 
includes any number of significant, well-informed commentators 
who have considered and written on this precise question.32 One 
might hesitate to embrace an entirely novel theory, like the one 
put forward here, unless the new theory carries great explanatory 
value otherwise lacking in extant competing theories. 
Second, there is at least one and perhaps two contemporane-
ous expositions of Federalist No. 77 that make use of the tradi-
                                                                                                                 
the appointment of a new one, before notice, are good; but his acts subsequent to 
notice are void.”). 
31. Justice Story, however, once put forth a view something like the one I put 
forward here. 
§ 1532. [I]n an early stage of the government, [the power of removal] 
underwent a most elaborate discussion [in Congress]. The language of the 
constitution is, that the president “shall nominate, and, by and with the 
advice and consent of the senate, appoint,” &c. The power to nominate 
does not naturally, or necessarily include the power to remove; and if the 
power to appoint does include it, then the latter belongs conjointly to the 
executive and the senate. In short, under such circumstances, the removal 
takes place in virtue of the new appointment, by mere operation of law. It 
results, and is not separable, from the [subsequent] appointment itself. 
§ 1533. This was the doctrine maintained with great earnestness by the 
Federalist [No. 77] . . . . 
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§§ 1532–1533 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833) (citation omitted). Story’s un-
derstanding of Federalist No. 77 seems to be that Hamilton was arguing that the 
only method by which an officer may be removed is by displacement or replacement, 
that is, subsequent appointment. I am arguing here, by contrast, that the original 
public meaning of Hamilton’s Federalist No. 77 was that removals generally would 
be effectuated by replacements and that Hamilton never took a stand either: (i) on 
whether or not the President had a freestanding removal power (arising from the 
Constitution even absent a statutory grant), or (ii) on whether or not the President 
could be awarded a constitutionally valid statutory removal power. If you believe 
that Story’s view and my own are identical, I am more than happy to give him full 
credit for the “new” view (by which I mean the original public meaning) of Feder-
alist No. 77. 
32. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 350 (1996); see also supra notes 9–10 (collecting ju-
dicial opinions and academic publications stating the standard view). 
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tional “displace means removal” position. On June 16, 1789, in 
debate on the House floor over the President’s removal power, 
Congressman William Loughton Smith stated:  
 I would premise, that one of these two ideas are just, ei-
ther that the constitution has given the president the power 
of removal, and therefore it is nugatory to make the declara-
tion here; or it has not given the power to him, and therefore 
it is improper to make an attempt to confer it upon him. If it 
is not given to him by the constitution, but belongs con-
jointly to the president and senate, we have no right to de-
prive the senate of their constitutional prerogative; and it 
has been the opinion of sensible men that the power was 
lodged in this manner. A publication of no inconsiderable 
eminence, in the class of political writings on the constitu-
tion, has advanced this sentiment. The author, or authors 
(for I have understood it to be the production of two gen-
tlemen of great information) of the work published under 
the signature of Publius, has these words: 
 “It has been mentioned as one of the advantages 
to be expected from the co-operation of the senate, 
in the business of appointments, that it would con-
tribute to the stability of the administration. The 
consent of that body would be necessary to dis-
place as well as [to] appoint.”33 
                                                                                                                 
33. 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA: 4 MARCH 1789–3 MARCH 1791, supra note 12, at 861 (indenta-
tion added to the second paragraph) (reproducing a June 16, 1789 extract from 
THE CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER in which Representative Smith’s House floor 
speech appeared, a speech which quoted Federalist No. 77). Smith made a similar 
point in the next day’s debate. Id. at 935 (“On this point I need only refer gentle-
men to the authority I quoted before. Publius sh[o]ws clearly the superior advan-
tage of having the president and senate combined in the exercise of this power.”). 
Congressman Smith should also be remembered for writing one of the more in-
teresting early commentaries on the Constitution. See WILLIAM SMITH, A COM-
PARATIVE VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL STATES WITH EACH OTHER, 
AND WITH THAT OF THE UNITED STATES (Philadelphia, John Thompson 1796). Un-
fortunately copies of Smith’s short treatise—perhaps better described as a lengthy 
pamphlet—are difficult to come by. See Letter from A. Hamilton to Wm. Smith, 
Esq. (April 5, 1797), in 21 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 20, 20 (Harold C. 
Syrett ed., 1974) (describing Smith’s A Comparative View as a “little work”). In any 
event, Smith’s work was well-informed. Compare SMITH, supra, at tbl.1 & n.n 
(“CONNECTICUT. [Governed under the] Old Colonial Charter of Charles II [of 
1662]. unaltered, except where necessary to adapt it to the Independence of the 
United States. . . . Governor, as Presid[ent] of the council, and the Speaker of the 
House, have each a vote, besides a casting vote.”), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 
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In context, this particular congressional debate was about re-
moval, qua removal. Here, Smith identified Publius’s displace-
ment power with removal. There is no indication that anyone 
speaking on the floor of the House contradicted Smith’s repre-
sentations about Publius’s meaning. 
In regard to the third piece of contrary evidence, our story 
takes an unusual twist. It is true that no one speaking on the 
floor of the House contradicted Smith, but apparently Hamil-
ton, speaking as Publius, did so to one of Smith’s contemporar-
ies. On June 21, 1789, after the June 16th debate, Smith wrote 
Edward Rutledge as follows: 
In the course of my speech, I quoted the Federalist as an au-
thority on my side, (see 2d vo., pa. 284 [of the 1788 edition of 
The Federalist])—the next day [Congressman Egbert] Benson 
sent me a note across the house to this effect: that Publius 
had informed him since the preceding day’s debate, that 
upon more mature reflection he had changed his opinion & 
was now convinced that the President alone should have the 
                                                                                                                 
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 366 (“It has been alleged, that it would 
have been preferable to have authorised the senate to elect out of their own body 
an officer [to act as Vice President and as Senate president] . . . . [But] to take the 
senator of any state from his seat as senator, to place him in that of president of 
the senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the state from which he came, a 
constant for a contingent vote.”), Steven G. Calabresi, Closing Statement, A Term 
of Art or the Artful Reading of Terms?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 134, 154 
(2008) (“[I]n eight hundred years of English and American history no King, 
Queen, colonial governor, or President has ever served simultaneously in the leg-
islature.”), and John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Rights of Legislators 
and the Wrongs of Interpretation: A Further Defense of the Constitutionality of Legisla-
tive Supermajority Rules, 47 DUKE L.J. 327, 333 n.28 (1997) (“We also believe that the 
Constitution forbids the House from conferring one vote on some Members while 
providing more than one vote to other Members.”). See generally Margaret A. 
Banks, The Chair’s Casting Vote: Some Inconsistencies and Problems, 16 U.W. ONT. L. 
REV. 197 (1977). Why modern commentators rely on (the anonymous) Hamilton, 
rather than on Smith, is one of the enduring mysteries. See, e.g., JOHN D. FEERICK, 
FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 51–52 (1965) 
(quoting Hamilton’s language above); ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE: 
PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES AND THE COURSE OF BUSINESS IN THE FRAMING OF 
STATUTES 448 (1922) (same); Richard Albert, The Evolving Vice Presidency, 78 TEMP. 
L. REV. 811, 822 & n.60 (2005) (same); cf. John F. Manning, Response, Not Proved: 
Some Lingering Questions About Legislative Succession to the Presidency, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 141, 149 n.46 (1995). But see supra note 1 (collecting scholarly authority ques-
tioning reliance on The Federalist). Is the answer really no more than The Federalist 
is easy to find? Cf. Marsha L. Baum & Christian G. Fritz, American Constitution-
Making: The Neglected State Constitutional Sources, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 199, 
226, 232 (2000) (citing Smith’s 1796 first edition and 1832 reprint). 
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power of removal at pleasure; He is a Candidate for the of-
fice of Secretary of Finance!34  
Looked at from one point of view, this letter, like Smith’s floor 
speech, contradicts the “displace means replace” theory. There 
would have been no reason to use terminology like “changed 
his opinion” if Hamilton’s views in Federalist No. 77 had never 
spoken to removal in the first instance.  
On the other hand, we should remember that this letter is akin 
to triple hearsay. Smith’s letter to Rutledge is summarizing the 
contents of a note from Benson—a note which we do not have. 
Benson’s note to Smith, assuming it ever existed, purportedly 
summarized a communication Benson received from Hamilton. 
And Hamilton, assuming he communicated with Benson as Ben-
son claimed, was purporting, in 1789, to explain his change of 
mind from views he had first published in 1788. I leave it to those 
who teach evidence to decide whether this information could 
come into court proceedings under any exceptions to the hearsay 
rule. Suffice it to say, not every scholar who has looked at this 
lengthy chain of communications has been willing to draw strong 
conclusions from it.35 Indeed, my own view is that—even if no 
one was intentionally fabricating—this story does not have the 
ring of truth. Smith was one of Hamilton’s close allies in the 
House.36 If Hamilton wanted to bend Smith’s ear, it would have 
                                                                                                                 
34. Letter of William Loughton Smith to Edward Rutledge (June 21, 1789), in 69 
S.C. HIST. MAG. 6, 8 (1968) (citations omitted); see also Letter from William Lough-
ton Smith to Edward Rutledge (June 21, 1789), in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 4 MARCH 1789–
3 MARCH 1791, supra note 27, at 831, 832–33. 
35. See, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 131 (“[I]n the meantime Benson informed 
Smith, accurately or inaccurately, that Hamilton had changed his mind . . . .”). Com-
pare Prakash, supra note 6, at 1038 n.121 (“During the debates, Hamilton apparently 
had a change of heart.” (citing the Smith to Rutledge letter of June 21)), with Saik-
rishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72, 
120 n.185 (2006) (denominating Hamilton’s later position as a “repudiat[ion]”). 
But see RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 350 (concluding, based on the Smith to Rutledge 
letter of June 21, that Hamilton had indeed changed his mind from the position 
announced in The Federalist); Richard S. Arnold, Madison Lecture: How James Madi-
son Interpreted the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 273–74 (1997) (agreeing with 
and quoting Rakove’s position). 
36. See, e.g., RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 459 (2004) (“Jefferson had 
guessed shrewdly: Hamilton either drafted Smith’s speech or provided the in-
formation.”); 12 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 545 n.4 (Harold C. Syrett 
ed., 1967) (noting that “Smith was a Federalist Congressman from South Caro-
lina and a frequent spokesman for H[amilton] in the House of Representatives”); 
id. at 543–44 (reproducing a letter, dated October 10, 1792, discussing Smith, from 
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made more sense to have spoken to Smith directly. Hamilton’s 
speaking through Benson was a strategy that needlessly risked 
embarrassing or alienating Smith, an actual or potential political 
ally. 
CONCLUSIONS 
So which view is correct: the traditional view (“displace 
means removal”) or the new view (“displace means replace”)? 
The truth is we can never really know.37 But the new theory 
does answer the three queries posed at the beginning of this 
Article. The new theory explains why Hamilton would have 
opined on a role for the Senate. His concession to Senate pow-
ers only went as far as to admit that the Senate had a role in 
any successive appointments, just as it had a role in any initial 
appointment. The new theory is in accord with his views (or, at 
least, the common understanding of his views) about unity in the 
executive. He never conceded any role for the Senate in removals, 
qua removal. Unity in the executive would still exist so long as the 
President had an independent removal power, unrelated to new 
appointments. The new theory is in accord with Hamilton’s plan 
for The Federalist: Hamilton never addressed removal, an issue not 
expressly addressed by the Constitution’s text. Finally, the new 
theory accounts for Hamilton’s actual language in Federalist No. 
77: Hamilton used the term displace, not removal. 
In any event I would ask you, the reasonable reader, to re-
read Hamilton and decide for yourself. 
It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be ex-
pected from the co-operation of the senate, in the business of 
appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the 
administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to 
displace as well as to appoint. A change of the chief magistrate 
                                                                                                                 
Hamilton to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney: “[Smith] is truly an excellent mem-
ber—a ready clear speaker of a sound analytic head and the justest views—I 
know no man whose loss from the House would be more severely felt by the good 
cause”). Admittedly, the communications above were drafted after 1789 or de-
scribed post-1789 events. See MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 130 (describing the 
1789 removal debates and noting that “Smith . . . was soon to become one of Ham-
ilton’s staunchest supporters”). 
37. The new view, however, has already received some approbation. See Letter 
from Professor Forrest McDonald to Seth Barrett Tillman (Feb. 14, 2009), available 
at http://works.bepress.com/seth_barrett_tillman/115/ (“Your argument [that is, 
the new view] is, in my opinion, irrefutable.”). 
 166 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 33 
therefore would not occasion so violent or so general a revo-
lution in the officers of the government, as might be ex-
pected if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man 
in any station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness 
for it, a new president would be restrained from attempting 
a change, in favour of a person more agreeable to him, by 
the apprehension that the discountenance of the senate 
might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of dis-
credit upon himself. Those who can best estimate the value 
of a steady administration will be most disposed to prize a 
provision, which connects the official existence of public 
men with the approbation or disapprobation of that body, 
which from the greater permanency of its own composition, 
will in all probability be less subject to inconstancy, than any 
other member of the government.38 
                                                                                                                 
38. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 407 (emphasis 
added). Recently, a group of prominent professors of constitutional law submitted 
a legal brief stating: 
Even Hamilton, who indicated some ambivalence about presidential 
removal in The Federalist No. 77, regarded the Decision of 1789 as settling 
the matter. See 4 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 638 n.3 (reprinting the 
1804 version of The Federalist Papers personally edited by Hamilton, which 
noted [in a footnote] that “it is now settled in practice, that the power of 
displacing belongs exclusively to the president [which amounts to the 
‘displace means remove’ view]”). 
Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 14 n.6, Free 
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 129 S. Ct. 2378 (Aug. 3, 2009) 
(No. 08-861), 2009 WL 2372919, at *14, 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 661, at *25 
(authored by Steven G. Calabresi et al.); accord Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher 
S. Yoo, Remove Morrison v. Olson, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 103, 112 n.44 (2009), 
available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lawreview/articles/2009/11/Calabresi-Yoo-
62-Vand-L-Rev-En-Banc-103.pdf (same). The authors of the amicus brief were 
apparently referring to the 1802 edition of The Federalist, edited by George F. Hop-
kins. See 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 290 & n.13 (cit-
ing THE FEDERALIST (New York, George F. Hopkins 1802)). As far as I know, no 
1804 edition exists: 1804 was the year of Hamilton’s death at the hands of Burr. 
(Adding to the confusion, Professors Lessig and Sunstein suggest the footnote goes 
back to an 1810 edition. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 25 n.114.) 
In my view, there is no solid basis for concluding that Hamilton approved of 
the footnote first appearing in the Hopkins edition. Admittedly, Harold C. Syrett, 
the editor of The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, concluded that the 1802 “Hopkins 
edition . . . must be taken as Hamilton’s final version of The Federalist.” 4 THE PA-
PERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 290. However, it is hardly clear 
that Syrett believed this to be the case in respect to the footnotes (that is, those 
footnotes originally authored by Hamilton when first published), as opposed to 
that part of the main text of The Federalist authored by Hamilton. Id. at 291 (“The 
[1788] McLean and [1802] Hopkins editions thus constitute Hamilton’s revision of 
the text of The Federalist.” (emphasis added)). Moreover, there is no written record 
from Hamilton indicating that he approved of this footnote or of any of the 
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changes first appearing in the Hopkins edition. But see Lessig & Sunstein, supra 
note 6, at 25 n.114 (stating obliquely “[t]here is no indication that this [purported 
1810] note is not Hamilton’s own words”—which is not particularly surprising 
given that Hamilton had already died six years prior to this edition’s publication). 
The only evidence Syrett puts forward indicating that Hamilton approved of 
the changes first appearing in the Hopkins edition is that Hamilton’s son, John C. 
Hamilton, in 1847, forty-five years after publication of the Hopkins edition and fifty-nine 
years after publication of the M’Lean edition of 1788, inquired from Hopkins about 
Alexander Hamilton’s involvement in the Hopkins 1802 edition. “Hopkins replied 
that the changes had been made by a ‘respectable professional gentleman’ who, 
after completing his work, had ‘put the volumes into the hands of your father, 
who examined the numerous corrections, most of which he sanctioned, and the 
work was put to press.’” 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 
291 (quoting Letter from George F. Hopkins to John C. Hamilton (February 8, 
1847) (on file with the Library of Congress)). Even if one fully credits this extraor-
dinary tale about Hamilton’s overall participation, and Syrett notes conflicting ac-
counts of Hamilton’s role, this story hardly establishes that Hamilton approved of 
the particular footnote at issue here. See id. at 291 (“[I]t is impossible to resolve the 
contradictory statements on Hamilton’s participation in the revisions included in 
the 1802 edition . . . .”). And, finally, even if we were one hundred percent sure 
that Alexander Hamilton approved of the Hopkins edition footnote in 1802—a 
footnote which no one contends he authored—that does not establish what he 
intended circa April 2, 1788 (when he first published Federalist No. 77) or how he 
was understood by the well-informed public at the time of ratification. See Bailey, 
The Traditional View, supra note 10, at 175 n.20. See generally Michael Coenen, Note, 
The Significance of Signatures: Why the Framers Signed the Constitution and What They 
Meant by Doing So, 119 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 17 n.67, 18 
n.69), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1308991 
(opining on ambiguities relating to Hamilton’s conduct at the Federal Conven-
tion). 
